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CONFLICT OF LAWS-RELEASE IN A TORT ACTION-EFFECT OF LEX LOCI 
DELICTI AND CoNTRACTUs-Plaintiff, defendant, and a third party were in-
volved in a three-car collision in Virginia. Plaintiff settled an action against 
the third party's estate by executing a release, entered into in New York, in 
which plaintiff reserved any claims which he might have against the de-
fendant. He then sued defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, in a federal 
district court in Pennsylvania. The lower court, applying Virginia law to 
determine the effect of a release of one joint tortfeasor, dismissed plaintiff's 
action. On appeal, held, affirmed. The law of the place of the tort governs 
the effect of a release, not the law of the state in which the release was 
executed.1 Bittner v. Little, (3d Cir. 1959) 270 F. (2d) 286. 
In actions solely in tort, the general rule is that the law of the place of 
tort prevails over the law of the forum.2 Likewise, in cases solely in contract 
the lex loci contractus is controlling.3 But where there are both tort and 
1 In diversity cases, the federal courts are bound to follow the state conflict of laws 
principles, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). But since the Penn-
sylvania courts have not dealt with this specific issue, the federal court must estimate the 
state court's position. 
2 Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (8th Cir. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 364; Fitzpatrick v. Inter-
national Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929); Orr v. Ahem, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 
691 (1928). 
s Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934). 
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contract elements in the same action, occurring in two different foreign 
jurisdictions, the problem of choosing the law applicable to each element 
becomes appreciably more difficult, especially when, as in the principal case, 
the policies of the two foreign states conflict. In New York, a release of one 
joint tortfeasor, which expressly reserves rights to pursue other joint tort-
feasors, is not technically a release but a covenant not to sue, and does not 
discharge the other defendants.4 Virginia, however, follows the strict 
common-law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor automatically re-
leases all others.5 In solving conflicts in cases involving such multiple con-
tacts, a court may take one of two approaches. It may use two or more 
choice-of-law principles, the law of Virginia determining the nature and 
extent of the defendant's liability in tort, but the law of New York deter-
mining the effect of the release.6 Or it may apply a single choice-of-law 
principle in such a manner as to select the law of one of the jurisdictions and 
completely exclude the laws of the others. Selection of the lex loci delicti 
exclusively does appear to be the majority viewpoint.7 But considering the 
reasons usually given for observing a foreign state's laws, such as comity,8 
the vested rights theory,9 or the insurance of conformity to the standards 
of conduct of the place of wrong, there seems to be no reason why any one 
body of law should regulate this entire series of transactions. The comity 
theory does not demand deference to one foreign jurisdiction at the expense 
of the other. Under the vested rights theory, a cause of action, created by 
another state, attaches to the litigants and follows them to any other state. 
The only source of the right is the law of the place of the act. Thus this 
theory cannot be reconciled with multiple contact cases like the principal 
case since there are two distinct acts involved, with New York and Virginia 
vesting conflicting rights in the litigants. As for the final argument, it is 
difficult to see how the effect of a release has any relation to standards of 
conduct, since it concerns the parties only after the negligent conduct has 
occurred. A better reason for observance of foreign law is to insure uni-
4Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903); Bator v. Barry, 282 App. Div. 
324, 122 N.Y.S. (2d) 604 (1953). 
5 First and Merchants Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Bank of Waverly, 170 Va. 496, 197 
S.E. 462 (1938). The rationale of the common law rule is that the injured party should 
not be entitled to recover double compensation. Of course, no one would allow the plain-
tiff a double recovery, but it ought to be a question of fact whether the amount received 
by the plaintiff in settlement was payment in full for his injuries. If defendant has proof 
that the settlement was in full, he can protect himself from incurring unnecessary costs 
by moving for a summary judgment. 
6See Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 ~.Y. 244,194 N.E. 692 (1935); O'Regan 
v. Cunard Steamship Co., 160 Mass. 356, 35 N.E. 1070 (1894). 
7 Preine v. Freeman, (E.D. Va. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 257; Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W.Va. 
250, 23 S.E. (2d) 606 (1942); Lindsay v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., (7th Cir. 1915) 226 F. 23. 
s See Whitford v. The Panama R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861). 
9 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Slater 
v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); 3 BEALE, A TREATISE ON nm CONFUcr OF 
LAws 1968 (1935). Justice Holmes refers to an "obligation" theory in the Slater case, but 
this is, in essence, just a variation of the vested rights theory. 
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formity of result in order to avoid the possibility that the choice of forum 
might prove decisive. The defendant should be protected no matter what 
forum is chosen by the plaintiff, if he has relied on the law of the place of 
tort and was in fact justified. But the defendant has not relied on any law 
in regard to the release. Rather, it is the plaintiff and the third party whose 
expectations are jeopardized. In such a situation, more flexibility would 
insure greater justice to all the parties. Such adaptability is facilitated by 
the local law theory, which recognizes that no state actually enforces the 
laws of another place.10 Instead, in adjusting the rights of suitors, the 
court imputes to them rights and duties similar to those which arose in the 
places where the relevant transactions occurred, and, under this theory, the 
public policy of the forum may be a factor in selecting the appropriate 
rules of law.11 In the principal case, if the court had looked to the public 
policy of the forum, they would have found that Pennsylvania by adopting 
the Uniform Contributions Among Tortfeasors Act12 has clearly shown its 
policy to be similar to that of New York. Concededly, public policy should 
be used sparingly in ignoring a foreign state's law, but here it could serve 
the useful function of aiding the forum in choosing between two foreign 
laws. Following this view the court should have allowed New York law 
to control the effect of the release. 
Stanley A. Williams 
10 This theory was expounded by Judge Learned Hand in Direction der Disconto-
Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1924) 300 F. 741, affd. 267 U.S. 22 (1925). It 
seems to have the support of CoNFLicr OF I..Aws REsrATEMENT, §6, comment a (1934), 
which says: " .•• The application of the rules of Conflict of Laws ..• is an application by 
the court of its own law to facts which include foreign events and foreign law." Under 
such a theory, there is no reason why a court must consider fact A (the law of Virginia) 
but not fact B (the law of New York). 
11 Certainly quite a few of the writers in the area recognize the propriety of such 
action. HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CoNFLicr OF LAws 64 (1942); RA.BEL, THE CONFLicr OF 
LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 2d ed., 96 (1958); Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Con• 
filct of Laws," 47 L.Q. REv. 483 (1931); Yntema, "The Hombook Method and the Conflict 
of Laws," 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928). Contra, STU?,rBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLicr OF LAws, 
2d ed., 199 (1951). In a few cases the courts have tacitly or expressly approved such 
procedure. Fox v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909); Galef 
v. United States, (E.D. S.C. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 134; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Cox, 
171 Ark. 103, 283 S.W. 31 (1926). 
12 Uniform Contributions Among Tortfeasors Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1951; Supp. 
1958) tit. 12, §2085. 
